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V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On appeal, Mr. Gill argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due 
process of law when it refused to augment the record with the transcript of his Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) hearing. Additionally, Mr. Gill argues that the 
district court abused its discretion when it partially denied his Rule 35 motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Gill left the state of Idaho without updating his sex offender registration. 
(Presentence investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.46.)1 During this time, Mr. Gill 
believed he was another person. (PSI, p.47.) A mental health evaluation found that 
Mr. Gill suffers from extreme mental illness, including a dissociative disorder, which led 
to his belief that he was actually someone else.2 (PSI, p.323.} 
Mr. Gill entered an Alford3 plea to Failure to Register as a Sex Offender, 
I.C. §§ 18-8304, 18-8307, 18-8308(2). (R., pp.143-44, 149-55; see generally 
Tr. 2/3/2011.} Mr. Gill also admitted he had three prior felony convictions and entered a 
guilty plea to the Persistent Violator enhancement, IC. § 19-2514. (R., pp.57-58, 69-70; 
see generally Tr. 2/3/2011.} In a letter to the court, Mr. Gill disputed most of the 
1 The electronic record titled 38754 Gill PSl.pdf contains many documents, including 
PSls from this case and the two prior cases, two addenda to the PSI, and an order 
Amending the PSI. For ease of reference, these documents will collectively be 
referenced as "the PSI" and the page citation will refer to the page number from the 
collective document. 
2 The Court also ordered an LC. § 18-211 evaluation. Although the competency 
evaluations were attached to the PSI, the district court correctly refused to consider any 
materials derived from the competency evaluation at sentencing. 
3 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970}. 
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contents of the PSL (PSI, pp.37-39.) The district court executed a unified sentence of 
twenty years, with ten years fixed. {R., pp.162-64.) 
Thereafter Mr. Gill timely filed a Rule 35 motion to reduce the sentence. 
(R., p.171.) Mr. Gill's Rule 35 motion included an affidavit and several documents. 
(Affidavit of Mr. Gill.) A Rule 35 hearing was held. (Minutes from the Rule 35 Hearing, 
7/21/2011.) After the hearing, the district court altered Mr. Gill's sentence and executed 
a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed. (Order Granting Motion to 
Reduce Sentence.) IVlr. Gill timely appealed the judgment of conviction and the order 
altering his sentence. {R., pp.162-63, 166-68; Order Granting Motion to Reduce 
Sentence.) 
On appeal, Mr. Gill filed a motion to augment the record with the Rule 35 hearing 
transcript. (Motion to Augment the Record, 8/8/2011.} The State did not object to the 
motion. The Supreme Court denied the motion to augment with the transcript of the 
Rule 35 hearing, because "it appears no evidence was produced at the hearing." 
(Order Augmenting the Record, 9/9/2011.) Thereafter, Mr. Gill filed a renewed motion 
to augment the record, citing the court minutes which indicated IVlr. Gill and the district 
court judge were exchanging comments during the Rule 35 hearing. (Renewed Motion 
to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, 
10/6/2011; Minutes from the Rule 35 Hearing, 7/21/2011.) The State did not object to 
the renewed motion. The Court denied the renewed motion to augment the record. 
(Order Denying Renewed Motion to Augment and To Suspend the Briefing Schedule, 
10/28/2011.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Gill due process and equal protection 
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the transcript of the Rule 35 hearing? 
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it partially denied Mr. Gill's 
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Gill Due Process And Equal Protection When It 
Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Transcript Of The Rule 35 
Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Gill asserts that the most relevant transcript for his Rule 35 appeal is missing 
from the record. The district court originally executed a unified sentence of twenty 
years, with ten years fixed. (R., pp.162-64.) After the Rule 35 hearing, the district court 
altered the sentence, and executed a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years 
fixed. (Order Granting Motion to Reduce Sentence.) The sentence, as altered by the 
order granting the Rule 35 motion, is the sentence to be reviewed on appeal. Mr. Gill 
submits that the district court's decision to alter the sentence was based al least in part 
on Mr. Gill's comments on his own behalf at the Rule 35 hearing. Thus, the most 
important transcript for review of the sentence currently in place, and now before the 
court on appeal, is not in the record. 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause to deny an 
indigent defendant access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues 
the defendant intends to raise on appeal. The only way a state can constitutionally 
preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove 
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal. 
Unlike State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457 (2002), in this case the district court asked 
Mr. Gill several questions directly and Mr. Gill responded to the district court. Therefore, 
the Rule 35 hearing was more than just argument of counsel, and the order partially 
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granting the Rule 35 motion was based on something more than documentary evidence 
and argument. 
B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Gill Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Transcript Of The 
Jurisdictional Review Hearing 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Gill With 
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His 
Sentencing Claims 
The constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art. 
I, §13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 
Dept. of Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing 
Smith v. Idaho Dep't of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771 (1996)). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, 
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); 
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I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. I.C.R. 5.2 mandates the 
production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a). 
Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court 
.... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript 
to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as 
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.?(a). An appeal from an order denying an Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 motion is an appeal of right as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11. 
State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891, 891-92 (Ct. App. 1983). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these 
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal 
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent 
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second 
theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for 
review. The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they 
request. In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal 
protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless 
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State 
6 
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to 
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts 
themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants 
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system - all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does give appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates 
against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty. Appellate 
review has now become an integral part of the Illinois trial system for 
finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Consequently at 
all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
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In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of 
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Bums, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, . . . they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be 
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protectlons 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
Here, an application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a 
situation analogous to the facts of Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a 
transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed 
without the transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must 
provide an adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed. "It is well established that 
an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate 
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the 
record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial 
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 
416, 422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 
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(Ct. App. 1992) ). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, 
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, 
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel 
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's 
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Gill fails to provide 
the appellate court with the requested item, the legal presumption will apply and 
Mr. Gill's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action alone 
which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a violation 
of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer apply. 
Without the requested item there is no way to review the district court's order altering 
the sentence. 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of 
both due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial 
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Gill's Motion to Augment will render 
his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcript supports 
the district court's Order Granting Motion to Reduce Sentence. This functions as a 
procedural bar to the review of Mr. Gill's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and 
therefore, Mr. Gill should either be provided with the requested transcript or the 
presumption should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Gill With 
Access To The Requested Transcript Has Denied Hirn Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
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Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned 
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably related to due process that the 
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The 
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was 
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was 
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... 
[to] hold otherwise would to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that 
there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free 
government which no member of the Union may disregard."' Id. at 71-72. 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendant's the 
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United State Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel 
on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to 
effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
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support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcript has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of 
the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether 
there is an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor 
of any argument made or either undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Gill has not 
obtained review of the trial proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with 
effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991 )), the starting point of evaluating 
whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel in a criminal action is the 
American Bar Association Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
These standards still offer insight into the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel. 
Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should 
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMII\JAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, 
Std. 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcript, counsel neither can 
make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal, nor 
can counsel consider all issues that might affect the district court's order altering the 
sentence. 
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Mr. Gill is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and effective 
assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant transcripts. 
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Gill's constitutional right to due 
process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. 
Accordingly, counsel should be provided with access to the requested transcript and 
should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing 
raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
3. Unlike State v. Strand, The Dialogue Between Mr. Gill And The District 
Court Was More Than Just Documentary Evidence And Argument 
State v. Strand, supra, addressed when a defendant is entitled to a transcript of 
the Rule 35 hearing on appeal. 
"Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our 
entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must, so far as the law 
is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every 
American court."' The State is not required, however, to purchase a 
stenographer's transcript in every case in which a defendant cannot buy 
one, ... nor is the State required to provide a transcript of all proceedings 
held below. "[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may choose to waste 
his money by unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcripts 
does not mean that the State must waste its funds by providing what is 
unnecessary for adequate appellate review." The State is only required to 
provide an indigent defendant a record on appeal that is sufficient for 
adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the proceedings 
below. 
Strand, 137 Idaho at 462. In Strand, neither the defendant nor the State offered any 
testimony. Id. In that case, a transcript of the Rule 35 hearing "would have shown only 
the arguments, if any, Defendant's counsel made during the hearing in an attempt to 
convince the district court to grant the Defendant leniency." Id. at 463. Thus, "[a] 
transcript of the hearing is not necessary for the Defendant to argue on appeal why it 
was an abuse of discretion for the district court not to grant the leniency requested." Id. 
''[W]hen a hearing is held but only documentary evidence is offered, the denial of the 
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motion to reduce sentence can be adequately reviewed on appeal without a 
stenographic transcript of the hearing." Id. 
In this case, although Mr. Gill did not testify, it appears from the court minutes 
that Mr. Gill was actively engaged in dialogue with the district court during the Rule 35 
hearing. (Rule 35 Hearing Court Minutes, dated 7/21/2011, p.2 ("13: 14:51 - Judge: 
Williamson, Darla comments and questions the Defendant with the Def's interspersed 
comments ... 13:17:01 - Judge: Williamson, Darla comments and questions the 
Defendant further").) Unlike Strand, at the Rule 35 hearing the district court asked 
Mr. Gill questions directly and Mr. Gill responded to the district court. Therefore, the 
Rule 35 hearing was more than just argument of counsel, and the order altering the 
sentence was based on something more than the documentary evidence and argument. 
For all the reasons stated above, Mr. Gill requests access to the requested 
transcript and the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising 
issues which arise as a result of that review. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Partially Denied The Rule 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
The District Court abused its discretion when it partially denied Mr. Gill's Rule 35 
motion for a reduction of his sentence because the sentence is excessive as altered, in 
light of the new information. Although the district court reduced the fixed portion of the 
sentence after the Rule 35 hearing, a unified sentence of twenty years is still excessive 
given the facts of the case. 
14 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Gill's Rule 35 
Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of Mr. Grant's Continuing Family 
Support 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251,253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App.1987) 
and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447 (Ct. App. 1984)). 'The criteria for examining rulings 
denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether 
the original sentence was reasonable." Id. (citing Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450, 680 P.2d at 
872). If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later 
show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented with the 
motion for reduction. Id. (citing State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires 
the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. 
State, 132 Idaho 573,581 (1999) (citing State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384,391 (1994)). If 
a defendant's mental condition is a significant factor, the court is required to consider 
factors such as: (a) the extent to which the defendant is mentally ill; (b) the degree of 
illness or defect and level of functional impairment; (c) the prognosis for improvement or 
rehabilitation; (d) any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public if not 
incarcerated, or the lack of such risk; and (f) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the 
requirements of the law at the time of the offense charged. Strand, 137 Idaho at 461. 
Mr. Gill's mental health evaluator noted that this crime arose when Mr. Gill 
underwent a psychotic episode where he actually believed he was someone else. (PSI, 
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p.323.) The evaluator described Mr. Gill's condition as a chronic and persistent thought 
disorder. (PSI, p.323.) In the evaluator's opinion, Mr. Gill was not malingering, nor was 
this psychotic episode a calculated attempted to avoid the legal consequences of 
having to register as a sex offender. (PSI, p.323.) Mr. Gill was described as a 
"mentally ill individual suffering from a psychotic disconnect from reality, which was 
clearly driven by a high level of paranoia and underscored by a strong and persistent 
Narcissism." (PSI, p.323.) Based on the evaluator's assessment, there is no doubt 
Mr. Gill is very mentally ill and had little "capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements 
of the law at the time of the offense charged." See Strand, 137 Idaho at 461. Mr. Gill 
acknowledges his psychotic condition and need for treatment. (PSI, p.36.) Mr. Gill listed 
as his number one goal in life is to "have a good handle on my mental health [and] 
spiritual problems." (PSI, p.66.) Given Mr. Gill's psychotic episode, the sentence is 
excessive given the nature of the offense. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007) 
(recognizing that appellate courts independent review the record, having due regard for 
the nature of the offense). 
Another mitigating factor that was not given appropriate weight by the district 
court when imposing sentence was Mr. Gill's childhood, where he suffered physical and 
emotional abuse. See State v. Walker, 129 Idaho 409,410 (Ct. App. 1996) (district court 
did not abuse its discretion in imposing fixed sentence of twenty-nine years for first 
degree murder because it considered, inter alia, that defendant "had been sexually 
assaulted as a child"); see also State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 423 (1985) (one factor 
supporting Idaho Supreme Court's holding that the death penalty was excessive was 
the defendant's "extremely troubled" childhood with "serious problems in the home 
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environment"). Mr. Gill was physically and mentally abused by his mother, including 
being whipped with a strap. (PSI, pp.37, 54-55.) Additionally, his mother threatened to 
kill him with a knife. (PSI, p.55.) The abuse was confirmed by his younger brother. (PSI, 
p.2; see also Tr. 4/18/2011, p.47, L.2-5.) 
Mr. Gill also offered new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion. In an 
affidavit, Mr. Gill told the court that he would have better access to mental health 
treatment outside of prison. (Affidavit of Mr. Gill, pp.1-2.) Additionally, Mr. Gill was 
taking many classes to better himself. (Affidavit of Mr. Gill, p.2.) Mr. Gill's mental health 
issues had stabilized and his prescription medications were working well. (Affidavit of 
Mr. Gill, p.2.) He laid out a detailed plan for release, including housing and 
employment. (Affidavit of Mr. Gill, pp.2-5.) Mr. Gill also submitted additional 
documentation showing his willingness to engage in mental health treatment. (Affidavit 
of Mr. Gill, pp.25-28.) Additionally, Mr. Gill was accepted to the Living with Mental 
Illness group in prison. (Affidavit of Mr. Gill, p.29.) 
For all the reasons stated above, the district court abused its discretion because 
Mr. Gill's unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed is excessive. Mr. Gill 
asks this Court to reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence from fifteen years to 
seven years. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gill respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. Alternatively, Mr. Gill asks this Court to reduce the 
indeterminate portion of his sentence from fifteen years to seven years. 
DATED this 15th day of December, 2011. 
JORDANE. TAYLOR 
Deputy S.tate Appellate Public Defender 
_/ 
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